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The plaintiff and appellant, Chris Ann Mellor, through her undersigned counsel, submit
this reply brief in response to the brief of appellee Wasatch Crest Insurance Company in
Liquidation ("Wasatch Crest'' or "the Liquidator").
RESPONSE TO THE LIQUIDATOR'S STATEMENT OF THE COURSE OF
PROCEEDINGS AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Liquidator bases much of its argument on the existence of the Second
Amended Notice of Determination ("SANOD") it attached as an exhibit to its Reply
Brief in the lower court dated June 29,2010. Record at 5641-5653. See, Liquidator's
Brief, pp. 9,12fl[2), 18, 19, 21-26; However, the Liquidator attached the SANOD as an
Exhibit to his Reply brief before the trial court purely for litigation strategy purposes.
The SANOD was not provided within reasonable time frames after Mellor requested the
Liquidator to decide her claim and was never properly served on either Mellor or her
counsel. As outlined in Mellor's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition
to Respondent and Appellee's Motion to Dismiss Appeal dated March 25, 2011, pp. 2-4,
the SANOD was provided only after the parties, through their counsel, had made efforts
to both obtain a decision from the Liquidator concerning the priority of Mellor's claim
and had also discussed the possibility of settling that claim. See the Affidavit of Brian S.
King dated March 25, 2011 filed previously in this appeal,ffl[3-11.
It was approximately a year after the final communications between counsel for
the parties in the summer of 2009 and approximately six months after thefilingof
Mellor's Motion for Summary Judgment in January of 2010 in this matter that the
Liquidator provided the SANOD. The Liquidator asserts that the SANOD triggered a 604

day timeframewithin which Mellor was obligated to either object to and appeal the
determination or be bound by the Liquidator's decision. However, even if the SANOD
did trigger the 60-day time frame, it would end on August 29,2010, approximately two
months before the trial court issued a ruling on Mellor's Motion for Summary Judgment.
In that Motion for Summary Judgment, Mellor requested a ruling from the trial court on
the very issue the SANOD purported to decide: the classification of Mellor's claim.
In its Statement of Facts, the Liquidator also states that "neither ORS nor
Medicaid ever filed a claim on its own behalf in the liquidation proceeding."
Liquidator's Brief, p. 11. This statement of fact is true in the sense that ORS did not
avail itself of its right under UCA § 26-19-5(l)(a) to bring a claim directly against
Wasatch Crest or the Liquidator to recover the medical assistance it provided to Mellor
for Hay den Williams' medical expenses. However, UCA § 26-19 et. Seq, Utah's
Medical Benefit Recovery Act, makes clear that ORS is not obligated to proceed directly
against Wasatch Crest or the Liquidator in matters involving claims for reimbursement of
Medicaid expenses. ORS may include its claim for reimbursement of monies paid to a
Medicaid recipient in a cause of action asserted by the Medicaid recipient against a third
party tortfeasor, or against entities such as Wasatch Crest, when those individuals or
entities are primarily responsible for paying medical expenses that Medicaid has initially
paid. See UCA § 26-19-7(2) and (4). In addition, state and federal law, read in
combination, create a lien by operation of law on any proceeds arising out of a claim a
Medicaid recipient, such as Mellor, pursues against a third party that results in

5

reimbursement of Medicaid funds. Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2002 UT 101, ]f8-9; 57
P.3d 1067, 1069.
ARGUMENT
I.

Standard of Review and Preservation of Error
The Liquidator points out that Mellor's Opening Brief was deficient for failing to

identify "the standard of appellant review with supporting authority" with either
"citations to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or a
statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court."
Wasatch Crest Opening Brief p. 14. Mellor acknowledges the oversight in its Opening
Brief and apologizes to the Court.
With regard to the issue presented for review identified in Mellor's Opening Brief,
the standard of appellate review is de novo based on the fact that the question before the
Court regarding whether Mellor's claim has Class Three or Class Six distribution priority
is a question of law. Mellor v. Wasatch Crest Ins. Co., 2009 UT 5, f7, 201 P.3d 1004,
1007. With regard to issues raised by Wasatch Crest in its Brief relating to whether the
trial court's Memorandum Decision and Order is a final Order appealable as a final
judgment, this issue is likewise a question of law that is reviewed under a de novo
standard of review. Id. Finally, with regard to Wasatch Crest's assertion that Mellor9s
claim is barred because she failed to file a timely objection to the Second Amended
Notice of Determination, this question is likewise a question of law that is reviewed
under a de novo standard of review. Id. The first issue was briefed by both parties in their
papers before the district court and was a focus of the trial court's ruling. Record, vol. 12,
6

pp. 5141-5327, vol. 13, pp. 5564-5603; 5615-5634; 5641-5653; 5702-5709. The second
and third issues are raised for the first time on appeal and were not in existence or ripe at
the time the parties briefed the issues before the trial court.
II.

The Trial Court's 11/1/10 Order is a Final Appealable Judgment
As stated by this Court in its March 31,2011, Order on Wasatch Crest's Motion to

Dismiss, the jurisdictional dispute was deferred by this Court until this plenary briefing.
As Wasatch Crest incorporated into its Brief the arguments made in its January 21, 2011,
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Dismissal, Mellor incorporates into
this Reply Brief her Memorandum of Points of Authorities in Opposition to Respondent
and Appellee's Motion to Dismiss Appeal dated March 25, 2011.
The Liquidator argues that the trial court's November 1,2010, Memorandum
Decision and Order ("the 11/1/10 Order") is not a final appealable order because it
simply ratified the Liquidator's request that the action be stayed and did not constitute
entry of a final decision on the merits. The face of the 11/1/10 Order indicates that
Wasatch Crest moved the Court to deny Mellor's motion for summary judgment or stay
the motion. 11/1/10 Order, p. 3. The trial court did both. It also analyzed the merits of
whether Wasatch Crest was estopped from denying payment of Mellor's claims and
discussed at some length whether Mellor had standing to pursue claims against Wasatch
Crest. 11/1/10 Order, pp. 3-5. In addition, the trial court analyzed where Mellor's claim
belonged in U.C.A. §31A-27-335's class framework. It basically adopted the
Liquidator's analysis and ruled that Mellor's claim fell into Class Sixratherthan Class
Three. 11/1/10 Order, pp. 6-7. The trial court disposed of all claims presented to it and
7

left nothing for the Liquidator to determine in additional administrative proceedings.
Indeed, the Liquidator has not identified any issues it asserts remain unresolved or have
yet to be decided based on the 11/1/10 Order. The only thing left to do in the case is
calculate the specific amount to be paid on Mellor's claim.
The existence of Mellor's Motion for Summary Judgment filed in January, 2010,
eventually prodded the Liquidator to provide the SANOD. It was months late in coming
and was not effective to fairly and properly serve notice of the Liquidator's decision to
either Mellor or her counsel. However, the SANOD does make clear that the reasoning
behind the Liquidator's decision to classify Mellor's claim as Class Six rather than Class
Three was the same as the trial court's eventual analysis. Taken together, the SANOD
and the 11/1/10 Order make unnecessary a stay and remand of the case to the Liquidator.
There is no question about what the Liquidator's decision would be if this Court rules
that the 11/1/10 Order was not a final appealable ruling and instead remands the matter to
the Liquidator for additional consideration. Remanding the case to the Liquidator would
be futile and a waste of resources and time.
In addition, there is risk of unfairness to Mellor associated with a remand to the
Liquidator. He has made clear his position that any claim by Mellor is barred based on
her failure to object to the SANOD within the 60 day time frame supposedly triggered by
the Liquidator's inclusion of the SANOD as an exhibit to the Liquidator's June 29, 2010,
Reply brief. For the reasons outlined in her March 25, 2011, Memorandum of Points and
Authority in Opposition to the Liquidator's Motion to Dismiss filed with this Court,
Mellor asserts that no 60 day time frame began to run. However, remanding the matter to
8

the Liquidator for further proceedings would not simply be a futile gesture. Rather, it
would prejudice Mellor's ability to require the Liquidator to consider the priority of her
claim under U.C.A. §31A-27-335 on the merits.
The Liquidator also asserts that the 11/1/10 Order states Mellor retains "the option
of challenging the latest notice of determination" within the Liquidation proceeding.
However, since the trial court made that statement, the Liquidator has made his position
clear to this Court that Mellor has lost the right to challenge the Liquidator's decision to
classify Mellor's claim as Class Six rather than Class Three. This makes more clear the
futility and risk of prejudice to Mellor of a remand to the Liquidator for additional
consideration of the appropriate classification of Mellor's claim.
In its brief the Liquidator asserts it was Mellor's "impatience" that improperly
caused her to appeal the trial court ruling. Liquidator's Brief, p. 19. This argument is
problematic in light of the Liquidator's failure to provide a timely notice of determination
of the priority of Mellor's claims after this Court's first decision in Mellor v. Wasatch
Crest, 2009 UT 5. The Liquidator's assertion that"... he learned new information once
the claim was remanded—that is, Medicaid had paid all of Hay den's medical expenses,"
Liquidator's Brief, p. 19, is implausible on its face. The Record shows that the Liquidator
had known for years that Medicaid stepped in and paid Mellor's medical expenses for
Hayden's treatment. Record, vol. 13, pp. 5583; 5602-5603; 5628-5634. Indeed, it was
Wasatch Crest's knowledge of Medicaid's involvement in paying Hayden William's
medical expenses that initially caused it to improperly terminate Hayden's coverage in
2001.
9

III.

Mellor is Not Barred From Challenging the Liquidator's Classification of
Her Claim Based on a Failure to Timely Object to the SANOD.

The Liquidator asserts that Mellor's failure to file an objection to the SANOD
within 60 days after June 29, 2010 bars her ability to appeal the Liquidator's decision on
that issue. The problem with imposing the 60-day deadline referenced in UCA § 31-A27-332(1) is that the Liquidator's process for considering Mellor's claim and issuing a
timely notice of determination was fundamentally flawed. In fact, shortly after this
Court's decision in Mellor v. Wasatch Crest, 2009 UT 5, Mellor again requested payment
of her claims from the Liquidator. But the Liquidator did not make any sort of timely
decision regarding the priority of her claim. Rather, as outlined in the Affidavit of Brian
S. King dated March 25, 2011, counsel for Mellor and the Liquidator traded
correspondence, had a face to face meeting together with the attorney for ORS, and
exchanged several telephone calls. Mellor's counsel offered to appear and provide
additional information to the Liquidator or the Utah Life and Health Insurance Guaranty
Association or respond to questions about Mellor's claim. However, nothing happened.
The claim stagnated. There were no additional communications from the Liquidator after
July, 2009, nor did the Liquidator provide any decision on the priority of Mellor's claim.
Consequently, Mellor filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in January of 2010. Record
at 5141-5187.
Even thefilingof Mellor's Motion for Summary Judgment did not prod any timely
decision on the priority of Mellor's claim. Rather, the Liquidator responded on April 27,
2010, by filing a Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative a Motion to Stay Claimant's
10

Motion for Summary Judgment or in the alternative a Memorandum in Opposition to
Mellor's Motion for Summary Judgment. Record at 5564-5603. After Mellor filed her
Consolidated Memorandum in Support of her Motion for Summary Judgment in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on June 1, 2010, the Liquidator filed his
June 29, 2010, Reply Memorandum in Support of his various motions. Only then did the
Liquidator provide the SANOD - as an exhibit to the Reply Memorandum. There was
nothing other than a reference to the SANOD in the Reply Memorandum to give notice to
Mellor or her counsel of the Liquidator's position that a 60-day time frame had begun on
June 29, 2010. The Reply Memorandum was simply part of litigation before the trial
court that, among other things, asked the trial judge to decide the same issue the SANOD
purported to address: what was the appropriate classification of Mellor's claim. The
Liquidator identifies no basis for his untimely issuance of the SANOD without waiting
for a resolution by a District Court Judge on the issue before the trial court. Mellor had no
reason to believe that the Liquidator's issuance of the SANOD overrode or cut short the
trial court's authority to rule on the issues the parties had briefed and placed before the
trial court.
The Liquidator is not just an adverse party in litigation. His powers and duties under
the Utah insurance code are in the nature of acting as afiduciaryto all interested parties
and stakeholders in connection with the liquidation of an insolvent insurer. U.C.A. §31A27-314. Mellor and other claimants against Wasatch Crest Insurance Company in
Liquidation are entitled to treatment by a Liquidator committed to thoroughly and
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impartially evaluate all claims presented to him. The Liquidator's action in sandbagging
Mellor with the SANOD is inconsistent with those fiduciary obligations.
IV.

Mellor's Claim is a Class Three Claim Under the Liquidation Statute

The language of the liquidation statute categorizes Class Three as "all claims
under the policies for losses incurred" including the following: (A) claims with the
federal, state or local governments; (B) third party claims

" U.C.A. § 31A-27-

335(2)(c)(i)(A)-(B). The statute also excludes from Class Three claims, " . . . that portion
of any loss for which indemnification is provided by other benefits or advantages
recovered or recoverable by the claimant...." U.C.A. §31A-27-335(2)(c)(iii).
Mellor's claim was a "loss incurred" by Mellor. Hay den Williams' medical
expenses should have been paid by Wasatch Crest but were not. Alternatively, the Utah
State Medicaid program, funded by federal and state tax dollars, incurred a loss when it
stepped up to the plate in lieu of Wasatch Crest, and paid Hay den Williams' medical
expenses. In addition, the lien ORS has under its collection agreement with Mellor or by
operation of law under the Medical Benefits Recovery Act constitutes a "third party
claim" which Mellor has the ability to assert.
The Liquidator argues that Medicaid's payment of Hay den Williams' medical
providers constitutes "indemnification," as that word is used under U.C.A. §31A-27335(2)(c)(iii) and this converts Mellor's claim to Class Six rather than Class Three.
However, while the entry of Medicaid onto the scene shortly after Hay den's accident in
2001 relieved Mellor of financial obligation to Hay den's medical providers, more than
this is required to constitute "indemnification" under this section of the insurance code.
12

The government assistance provided from state and federal funds from Medicaid
to Mellor for Hay den William's medical expenses were not "indemnification" in the true
sense of the word. Medicaid's payment of benefits constituted a stop-gap measure by the
payor of last resort to prevent the financial problems that Hay den's large medical
expenses would have created for Mellor. The express terms of the United States Code
make clear that to the extent any third party such as Wasatch Crest is determined to be
primarily responsible for medical expenses initially paid by Medicaid, that third party has
an obligation to repay Medicaid. Thus, Medicaid's payment was not 'Indemnification"
of Hay den's medical expenses because that government program contemplates being
repaid by the party that should have been responsible for payment of those medical
expenses in the first place.
Cases involving the Medical Benefit Recovery Act are more commonly seen in the
context of personal injury claims. Recipients of Medicaid benefits have their medical
bills paid following an accidental injury and are therefore not responsible for additional
payment to their healthcare providers. However, it is very clear in those cases that the
recipients are in no way indemnified from an obligation to reimburse Medicaid upon
recovery from a third party. In S.S. v. State of Utah, 972 P.2d 439 (UT 1998),
Medicaid's right to reimbursement had priority over the creation of a special needs or
supplemental needs trust for S.S. Id. at 444. The Utah Supreme Court has previously
held that:
[p]ayments made by a third party do not legally become the property
of the recipient until after a valid settlement, which necessarily must
include reimbursement to Medicaid.
13

Houghton, 57 P.3d at 1069, citing State v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, P10, 999 P.2d 572 (UT
2000) and Wallace v. Estate of Jackson, 972 P.2d 446, 448 (UT 1998).
Even if Medicaid indemnified Mellor for Hay den's medical claims, nothing in the
insurance code prevents the indemnitor, the Utah State Medicaid program through its
agent, ORS and Mellor in this case, from stepping up to assert a Class Three rather than
Class Six claim under the statute. In placing Mellor's claim in the proper category, the
priority classification framework found in U.C.A. §31A-27-335 must be read in
combination with the Medical Benefits Recovery Act and federal statutes designed to
protect the integrity of the federal and state monies used to fund the Utah State Medicaid
program. Synthesizing these state and federal statutes requires that the Liquidator provide
funds to make the taxpayer whole to the greatest extent possible rather than favor the
interests of insurance company shareholders.
The Liquidator argues that as of July 31, 2003 when Wasatch Crest was taken into
liquidation, there was no policy in force on that date. Liquidator's Brief, p. 29. However
this is sophistry. Under this Court's initial decision, the policy should have been into
effect as of August 1, 2001 and thereafter for the entire time frame Hayden Williams was
entitled to COBRA coverage under the Wasatch Crest policy. The only reason it was not
in place was because Wasatch Crest improperly terminated that coverage. Mellor v.
Wasatch Crest, 2009 UT 5,1J21.
Next, Wasatch Crest asserts that Mellor's claim is not a governmental claim
because it was only she, and not ORS, who filed a claim for loss under her Wasatch Crest
14

policy. Liquidator's Brief, p. 29. In this, the Liquidator is simply wrong. ORS did assert
a claim, albeit through Mellor, as allowed under the Medical Benefits Recovery Act.
U.C.A. §26-19-7.
To the extent that medical assistance is actually provided to a
recipient, all benefits for medical services or payments from a third
party otherwise payable to or on behalf of a recipient are deemed to be
assigned to [Medicaid] if [Medicaid] provides, or becomes obligated
to provide, medical assistance. . . .
U.C.A. §26-19-4.5(1) (emphasis added). The Liquidator provides no authority to support
the idea that he may ignore that claim or treat ORS's lien as inferior in any way to a
claim by any insured under the policy.
The Liquidator argues that Mellor's claims are not claims of the federal, state or
local government because ORS has never filed a claim as required under the Liquidation
Act with respect to benefits paid for Hay den William's medical expenses. Liquidator
Brief, p. 32. However, the Medical Benefits Recovery Act states that once notice is
given to a third party, such as Wasatch Crest, of the interest that ORS has in a claim, the
insurer must "accept the state's right of recovery and the assignment to the state of any
right of a person to payment from a party for an item or service for which payment has
been made under the state plan." U.C.A. §26-19-4.7(2). The Medical Benefits Recovery
Act also makes clear that ORS has no obligation to directly file a claim against third
parties such as Wasatch Crest for payment of unreimbursed medical expenses. Rather,
ORS has the ability to rely on the efforts of Mellor and her counsel in pursuing third
parties for recovery of medical expenses that constitute unreimbursed funds owed to
ORS.
15

In short, the Medical Benefits Recovery Act acknowledges the standing Mellor
has as an insured and also requires the Liquidator to acknowledge that ORS, standing in
the shoes of Mellor, may assert a claim with the same authority and priority Mellor
herself has. So long as notice of both Mellor's and ORS's interests were timely provided
to Wasatch Crest and the Liquidator, they have no ability to treat Mellor's claim as Class
Six rather than Class Three. Paragraphs 27 through 29 of Mellor's Statement of Facts in
her Opening Brief make clear the requisite notice of both Mellor's and ORS's claims was
provided to both Wasatch Crest and the Liquidator.
The Liquidator repeatedly attempts to characterize Mellor's arguments as
"equitable" to tie into the language of UCA § 31A-27-335(l)(d) that states that "claims
by shareholders, policy holders or other creditors may not be permitted to circumvent
priority classes outlined in the statue through the use of equitable remedies." However,
this is simply an inaccurate characterization of Mellor's claims. They were and are based
on contract, tort and statutory language. There is nothing "equitable,"as that term is used
in UCA § 31A-27-335(l)(d), about Mellor's claims.
DATED this j ^ d a y of August, 2011.
Brian S. King
(
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been
delivered via first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, in both hard copy and on CD to the
following:
John P. Harrington
HOLLAND & HART
222 South Main Street, Suite 2200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2001
DATED this f^day of August, 2011.

C\LK
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UTAH HEALTH CODE
(9) "Provider" means a person or entity who provides
rvices to a recipient.
(10) "Recipient" means:
(a) a person who has applied for or received medical assistance from the state;
(b) the guardian, conservator, or other personal
representative of a person under Subsection (10)(a) if
the person is a minor or an incapacitated person; or
(c) the estate and survivors of a person under
Subsection (10)(a) if the person is deceased.
(11) "State plan" means the state Medicaid program as
nacted in accordance with Title XIX, federal Social
ecurity Act.
(12) "Third party" includes:
(a) an individual, institution, corporation, public
or private agency, trust, estate, insurance carrier,
employee welfare benefit plan, health maintenance
organization, health service organization, preferred
provider organization, governmental program such
as Medicare, CHAMPUS, and workers' compensation, which may be obligated to pay all or part of the
medical costs of injury, disease, or disability of a
recipient, unless any of these are excluded by department rule; and
(b) a spouse or a parent who:
(i) may be obligated to pay all or part of the
medical costs of a recipient under law or by court
or administrative order; or
(ii) has been ordered to maintain health, dental, or accident and health insurance to cover
medical expenses of a spouse or dependent child
by court or administrative order.
(13) "Trust" shall have the same meaning as provided
ii Section 75-1-201.
2007
9-3.

Program e s t a b l i s h e d b y department — Promulgation of rules.
' The department shall establish and maintain a program
he recoupment of medical assistance.
i The department may promulgate rules to implement
)urposes of this chapter.
1984
9-4.

Repealed.

1984

9-4.5. Assignment of rights to benefits.
) (a) To the extent t h a t medical assistance is actually
provided to a recipient, all benefits for medical services or
payments from a third party otherwise payable to or on
behalf of a recipient are assigned by operation of law to
the department if the department provides, or becomes
obligated to provide, medical assistance, regardless of
who made application for the benefits on behalf of the
recipient,
(b) The assignment:
(i) authorizes the department to submit its claim
to the third party and authorizes payment of benefits
directly to the department; and
(ii) is effective for all medical assistance.
) The department may recover the assigned benefits or
nents in accordance with Section 26-19-5 and as otherwise
dded by law.
) The assignment of benefits includes medical support
third party payments ordered, decreed, or adjudged by
court of this state or any other state or territory of the
ted States. That assignment is not in lieu of, and does not
3rsede or alter any other court order, decree, or judgment.
) When an assignment takes effect, the recipient is entito receive medical assistance, and the benefits paid to the
artment are a reimbursement to the department.
1998

26-19-5

26-19-4.7. Health insurance entity — Duties related to
state claims for Medicaid payment or recovery.
As a condition of doing business in the state, a health
insurance entity shall:
(1) with respect to a person who is eligible for, or is
provided, medical assistance under the state plan, upon
the request of the Department of Health, provide information to determine:
(a) during what period the person, or the spouse or
dependent of the person, may be or may have been,
covered by the health insurance entity; and
(b) the nature of the coverage that is or was
provided by the health insurance entity described in
Subsection (l)(a), including the name, address, and
identifying number of the plan;
(2) accept the state's right of recovery and the assignment to the state of any right of a person to payment from
a party for an item or service for which payment has been
made under the state plan;
(3) respond to any inquiry by the Department of Health
regarding a claim for payment for any health care item or
service that is submitted no later than three years after
the day on which the health care item or service is
provided; and
(4) not deny a claim submitted by the Department of
Health solely on the basis of the date of submission of the
claim, the type or format of the claim form, or failure to
present proper documentation at the point-of-sale that is
the basis for the claim, if:
(a) the claim is submitted no later than three years
after the day on which the item or service is furnished; and
(b) any action by the Department of Health to
enforce the rights of the state with respect to the
claim is commenced no later t h a n six years after the
day on which the claim is submitted.
2007

26-19-5. Recovery of medical assistance from third
party — Lien — Notice — Action — Compromise or waiver — Recipient's right to action
protected.
(1) (a) When the department provides or becomes obligated
to provide medical assistance to a recipient that a third
party is obligated to pay for, the department may recover
the medical assistance directly from that third party.
(b) Any claim arising under Subsection (l)(a) or Section
26-19-4.5 to recover medical assistance provided to a
recipient is a lien against any proceeds payable to or on
behalf of the recipient by that third party. This lien has
priority over all other claims to the proceeds, except
claims for attorney's fees and costs authorized under
Subsection 26-19-7(2)(c)(ii).
(2) (a) The department shall mail or deliver written notice
of its claim or lien to the third party at its principal place
of business or last-known address.
(b) The notice shall include:
(i) the recipient's name;
(ii) the approximate date of illness or injury,
(hi) a general description of the type of illness or
injury; and
(iv) if applicable, the general location where the
injury is alleged to have occurred.
(3) The department may commence an action on its claim or
lien in its own name, but that claim or lien is not enforceable
as to a third party unless:
(a) the third party receives written notice of the department's claim or lien before it settles with the recipient; or
(b) the department has evidence that the third party
had knowledge that the department provided or was
obligated to provide medical assistance.

26-19-6
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(4) The department may:
(a) waive a claim or lien against a third party in whole
or in part; or
(b) compromise, settle, or release a claim or lien.
(5) An action commenced under this section does not bar an
action by a recipient or a dependent of a recipient for loss or
damage not included in the department's action.
(6) The department's claim or lien on proceeds under this
section is not affected by the transfer of the proceeds to a trust,
annuity, financial account, or other financial instrument.

e-mail in accordance with Rule 5 of the Utah R 1
Procedure, to the director of the Office of Rec °f0iv^
vices.
overy Ser(d) The notice of claim shall include th* foU
rn
information:
^
°wing
(i) the name of the recipient;
(ii) the recipient's Social Security number
(iii) the recipient's date of birth;
*
(iv) the name of the recipient's attorney if appli
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(v) the name or names of individuals or entit*
against whom the recipient is making the claim^f
known;
'
(vi) the name of the third party's insurance carrier
if known;
'
(vii) the date of the incident giving rise to the
claim; and
(viii) a short statement identifying the nature of
the recipient's claim.
(2) (a) Within 30 days of receipt of the notice of the claim
required in Subsection (1), the department shall acknowledge receipt of the notice of the claim to the recipient or
the recipient's attorney and shall notify the recipient or
the recipient's attorney in writing of the following:
(i) if the department has a claim or lien pursuant
to Section 26-19-5 or has become obligated to provide
medical assistance; and
(ii) whether the department is denying or granting
written consent in accordance with Subsection (l)(a).
(b) The department shall provide the recipient's attorney the opportunity to enter into a collection agreement
with the department, with the recipient's consent, unless:
(i) the department, prior to the receipt of the notice
of the recipient's claim pursuant to Subsection (1),
filed a written claim with the third party, the third
party agreed to make payment to the department
before the date the department received notice of the
recipient's claim, and the agreement is documented
in the department's record; or
(ii) there has been a failure by the recipient's
attorney to comply with any provision of this section
by:
(A) failing to comply with the notice provisions
of this section;
(B) failing or refusing to enter into a collection
agreement;
(C) failing to comply with the terms of a collection agreement with the department; or
(D) failing to disburse funds owed to the state
in accordance with this section.
(c) (i) The collection agreement shall be:
(A) consistent with this section and the attorney's obligation to represent the recipient and
represent the state's claim; and
(B) state the terms under which the interests
of the department may be represented in an
action commenced by the recipient.
(ii) If the recipient's attorney enters into a written
collection agreement with the department, or includes the department's claim in the recipient's claim
or action pursuant to Subsection (4), the department
shall pay attorney's fees at the rate of 33.3% of the
department's total recovery and shall pay a proportionate share of the litigation expenses directly related to the action.
(d) The department is not required to enter into a
collection agreement with the recipient's attorney for
collection of personal injury protection under Subsection
31A-22-302(2).

26-19-6. Action by department — Notice to recipient.
(1) (a) Within 30 days after commencing an action under
Subsection 26-19-5(3), the department shall give the
recipient, his guardian, personal representative, trustee,
estate, or survivor, whichever is appropriate, written
notice of the action by:
(i) personal service or certified mail to the last
known address of the person receiving the notice; or
(ii) if no last-known address is available, by publishing a notice:
(A) once a week for three successive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the county
where the recipient resides; and
(B) in accordance with Section 45-1-101 for
three weeks.
(b) Proof of service shall be filed in the action.
(c) The recipient may intervene in the department's
action at any time before trial.
(2) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall name the
court in which the action is commenced and advise the
recipient of:
(a) the right to intervene in the proceeding;
(b) the right to obtain a private attorney; and
(c) the department's right to recover medical assistance
directly from the third party.
2009
26-19-7. Notice of claim by recipient — Department
response — Conditions for proceeding — Collection agreements — Department's right to
intervene — Department's interests protected
— Remitting funds — Disbursements — Liability and penalty for noncompliance.
(1) (a) A recipient may not file a claim, commence an
action, or settle, compromise, release, or waive a claim
against a third party for recovery of medical costs for an
injury, disease, or disability for which the department has
provided or has become obligated to provide medical
assistance, without the department's written consent as
provided in Subsection (2)(b) or (4).
(b) For purposes of Subsection (l)(a), consent may be
obtained if:
(i) a recipient who files a claim, or commences an
action against a third party notifies the department
in accordance with Subsection (l)(d) within ten days
of making his claim or commencing an action; or
(ii) an attorney, who has been retained by the
recipient to file a claim, or commence an action
against a third party, notifies the department in
accordance with Subsection (l)(d) of the recipient's
claim:
(A) within 30 days after being retained by the
recipient for that purpose; or
(B) within 30 days from the date the attorney
either knew or should have known that the
recipient received medical assistance from the
department.
(c) Service of the notice of claim to the department
shall be made by certified mail, personal service, or by
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i If the department receives notice pursuant to Subion (1), and notifies the recipient and the recipient's
rney that the department will not enter into a collecagreement with the recipient's attorney, the recipient
f proceed with the recipient's claim or action against
third party if the recipient excludes from the claim:
(i) any medical expenses paid by the department;
or
(ii) any medical costs for which the department is
obligated to provide medical assistance,
b) When a recipient proceeds with a claim under
bsection (3)(a), the recipient shall provide written noB to t h e third party of the exclusion of the department's
im for expenses under Subsection (3)(a)(i) or (ii).
f the department receives notice pursuant to Subsec), and does not respond within 30 days to the recipient
recipient's attorney, the recipient or the recipient's
(a) may proceed with the recipient's claim or action
,rainst the third party;
(b) may include the state's claim in the recipient's claim
• action; and
(c) may not negotiate, compromise, settle, or waive the
3partment's claim without the department's consent.
The department has an unconditional right to intervene
action commenced by a recipient against a third party for
irpose of recovering medical costs for which the departhas provided or has become obligated to provide medical
,ance.
(a) If the recipient proceeds without complying with the
•revisions of this section, the department is not bound by
my decision, judgment, agreement, settlement, or com)romise rendered or made on the claim or in the action.
(b) The department may recover in full from the recipent or any party to which the proceeds were made
payable all medical assistance which it has provided and
retains its right to commence an independent action
against the third party, subject to Subsection 26-19-5(3).
) Any amounts assigned to and recoverable by the departt pursuant to Sections 26-19-4.5 and 26-19-5 collected
ctly by the recipient shall be remitted to the Bureau of
ical Collections within the Office of Recovery Services no
r t h a n five business days after receipt.
) (a) Any amounts assigned to and recoverable by the
department pursuant to Sections 26-19-4.5 and 26-19-5
collected directly by the recipient's attorney must be
remitted to the Bureau of Medical Collections within the
Office of Recovery Services no later than 30 days after the
funds are placed in the attorney's trust account.
(b) The date by which the funds must be remitted to
the department may be modified based on agreement
between the department and the recipient's attorney.
(c) The department's consent to another date for remittance may not be unreasonably withheld.
(d) If the funds are received by the recipient's attorney,
no disbursements shall be made to the recipient or the
recipient's attorney until the department's claim has been
paid.
19) A recipient or recipient's attorney who knowingly and
tentionally fails to comply with this section is liable to the
partment for:
(a) the amount of the department's claim or lien pursuant to Subsection (5);
(b) a penalty equal to 10% of the amount of the department's claim; and
(c) attorney's fees and litigation expenses related to
recovering the department's claim.
2005

26-19-9.5

26-19-8,

Statute of limitations — Survival of right of
a c t i o n — Insurance policy not to limit time
allowed for recovery.
(1) (a) Subject to Subsection (6), action commenced by the
department under this chapter against a health insurance entity must be commenced within:
(i) subject to Subsection (7), six years after the day
on which the department submits the claim for recovery or payment for the health care item or service
upon which the action is based; or
(ii) six months after the date of the last payment
for medical assistance, whichever is later,
(b) An action against any other third party, the recipient, or anyone to whom the proceeds are payable must be
commenced within:
(i) four years after the date of the injury or onset of
the illness; or
(ii) six months after the date of the last payment
for medical assistance, whichever is later.
(2) The death of the recipient does not abate any right of
action established by this chapter.
(3) (a) No insurance policy issued or renewed after J u n e 1,
1981, may contain any provision t h a t limits the time in
which the department may submit its claim to recover
medical assistance benefits to a period of less than 24
months from the date the provider furnishes services or
goods to the recipient.
(b) No insurance policy issued or renewed after April
30, 2007, may contain any provision t h a t limits the time
in which the department may submit its claim to recover
medical assistance benefits to a period of less than t h a t
described in Subsection (l)(a).
(4) The provisions of this section do not apply to Section
26-19-13.5.
(5) The provisions of this section supercede any other
sections regarding the time limit in which an action must be
commenced, including Section 75-7-509.
(6) (a) Subsection (l)(a) extends the statute of limitations
on a cause of action described in Subsection (l)(a) t h a t
was not time-barred on or before April 30, 2007.
(b) Subsection (l)(a) does not revive a cause of action
t h a t was time-barred on or before April 30, 2007.
(7) An action described in Subsection (l)(a) may not be
commenced if the claim for recovery or payment described in
Subsection (l)(a)(i) is submitted later than three years after
the day on which the health care item or service upon which
the claim is based was provided.
2007
26-19-9. E m p l o y e e benefit plans.
As allowed pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 1144, an employee
benefit plan may not include any provision t h a t has the effect
of limiting or excluding coverage or payment for any health
care for an individual who would otherwise be covered or
entitled to benefits or services under the terms of the employee
benefit plan based on the fact that the individual is eligible for
or is provided services under the state plan.
1993
26-19-9.5. Availability of i n s u r a n c e policy.
If the third party does not pay the department's claim or lien
within 30 days from the date the claim or lien is received, the
third party shall:
(1) provide a written explanation if the claim is denied;
(2) specifically describe and request any additional
information from the department that is necessary to
process the claim; and
(3) provide the department or its agent a copy of any
relevant or applicable insurance or benefit policy.
2004
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health care obligations of the insolvent managed care
organization to other managed care organizations or
other insurers, if those other managed care organizations and ether insurers are licensed or have a
certificate of authority to provide the same health
care services in this state t h a t is held by the insolvent
managed care organization.
(ii) The rehabilitator or liquidator may combine
group and individual health care obligations of t ^ e
insolvent managed care organization in any m a n n § r
the rehabilitator or liquidator considers best to provide for continuous health care coverage for t ^ e
maximum number of enrollees of the insolvent managed care organization.
(iii) If the terms of a proposed transfer of the s a i ^ e
combination of group and individual policy oblig a _
tions to more t h a n one other managed care organiz a .
tion or insurer are otherwise equal, the rehabilitator
or liquidator shall give preference to the transfer 0 f
the group and individual policy obligations of ^n
insolvent managed care organization as follows:
(A) from one category of managed care organization to another managed care organization 0 f
the same category, as follows:
(I) from a limited health plan to a limited
health plan;
(II) from a health maintenance organisation to a health maintenance organization,;
(III) from a preferred provider organisation to a preferred proviafer organization;
(IV) from a fraternal benefit society to a
fraternal benefit society; and
(V) from any entity similar to any of t ^ e
above to a category t h a t is similar;
(B) from one category of managed care organization to another managed care organization
regardless of the category of the transferee m a n l
aged care organization; and
(C) from a managed care organization to a
nonmanaged care provider of health care cov^ r .
age, including insurers.
(f) If an insolvent managed care organization h a s required surplus, a rehabilitator or liquidator may use t ^ e
insolvent managed care organization's required surplus to
continue to provide coverage for the insolvent managed
care organization's enrollees, including paying uncovered
expenditures.
20o8
31A-27-312. D i s s o l u t i o n of insurer.
The commissioner may petition for an order dissolving t^e
corporate existence of a domestic insurer or the United S t a t e s
branch of an alien insurer domiciled in this state at the t i i ^ e
the commissioner applies for a liquidation order. The co^rt
shall order dissolution of the corporation upon petition by t a e
commissioner upon or after the granting of a liquidation ord^ r .
If the dissolution has r>ot previously heeu ordered, it shah )je
effected by operation of law upon the discharge of the liquidator if the insurer is insolvent. However, dissolution may \>e
ordered by the court upon the discharge of the liquidator if the
insurer is under a liquidation order for some other reaso n #
Notwithstanding the above, upon application by the commi s .
sioner and following notice as prescribed by the court and a
hearing, the court may sell the corporation as an entity^
together with any of its licenses to do business, despite % e
entry of an order of liquidation. The sale may be made t>n
terms and conditions the court considers appropriate. However, the order approving the sale shall provide t h a t the
proceeds of the sale shall become part of the assets of the
liquidation estate, to be distributed in the manner set forth m

Section 31A-27-335, and that the corporate entity and fts

licenses shall thereafter be free and clear from the claims
interests of all claimants, creditors, policyholders, and stocl
holders of the corporation under liquidation.
Tj
31A-27-313. Legislative intent concerning retention of
jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction for rehabilitation and liquidation actions is j»
the state courts of the insurer's state of domicile, v^g?
possible and practical.
19te
31A-27-314. P o w e r s and d u t i e s of t h e liquidator.
(1) The liquidator shall report to the court, at intervals
specified by the court, on the progress of the liquidation m
whatever detail the court orders. Unless the court orders
otherwise, the liquidator has the powers and responsibilities
described in this Subsection (1).
(a) (i) The liquidator may:
(A) appoint a special deputy to act for th$
liquidator under this chapter; and
(B) determine the special deputy's compensa,
tion, subject to the approval of the court.
(ii) The special deputy h a s all the powers of th$
liquidator granted by this section.
(iii) The special deputy serves at the pleasure of
the liquidator.
(b) (i) The liquidator may appoint or engage:
(A) employees and agents;
(B) legal counsel p u r s u a n t to Section 31A-^
108;
(C) actuaries;
(D) accountants;
(E) appraisers;
(F) consultants; and
(G) other personnel necessary to assist in the!
liquidation.
(ii) The career service laws do not apply to t h |
persons described in Subsection (l)(b)(i).
(c) The liquidator may fix the compensation of persoitf
under Subsection (l)(b), subject to the approval of t h |
court.
(d) (i) The liquidator may defray all reasonable d |
penses of taking possession of, conserving, conduc|j
ing, liquidating, disposing of, or otherwise de
with the business and property of the insurer.
(ii) If the property of the insurer does not conta
sufficient cash or liquid assets to defray the :
able costs incurred, the commissioner may adva
the costs so incurred out of t h e department's appit
priation.
}
(iii) Any amounts paid under Subsection (lXdXi|
are expenses of administration and shall be repaid fr
the credit of the department out of the first ava'* l
cash of the insurer.
(e) The liquidator may:
(J) hold hearings;
(ii) subpoena witnesses and compel their attefil
dance;
(iii) administer oaths;
(iv) examine any person under oath;
(v) compel any person to subscribe to that P e r s 0 1 j |
testimony after it h a s been correctly reduced
writing; and
(vi) in connection with a proceeding under
Subsection (l)(e), require the production of any•boos
papers, records, or other documents t h a t the u C l u l C ^
tor considers relevant to the inquiry.
M
(f) The liquidator may collect all debts and claims <W|
and money belonging to the insurer, wherever locatett
and for this purpose:
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(A.) The liquidator shall make recommendations to the court
nder Section 31A-27-336 for the allowance of an insured's
•laim under Subsection (3) after consideration of the probable
utcome of any pending action against the insured on which
he claim is based, the probable damages recoverable in the
ction and the probable costs and expenses of defense. After
Jlowance of the claim by the court, the liquidator shall
withhold any distributions payable on the claim, pending the
utcome of the litigation and negotiation with the insured.
Whenever it seems appropriate, the liquidator may reconsider
he claim on the basis of additional information and amend
he recommendations to the court. The insured shall be
iforded the same notice and opportunity to be heard on all
hanges in the recommendation as in its initial determination,
lie court may amend its allowance as it determines is
ppropriate. As claims against the insured are settled or
arred, the insured shall be paid from the amount withheld
hie same percentage distribution as was paid on other claims
f like priority, based on the lesser of:
(a) the amount actually recovered from the insured by
the action or paid by the agreement, plus the reasonable
costs and expenses of defense; and
(b) the amount allowed on the claims by the court.
After all claims are settled or barred, any sum remaining
•om the amount withheld shall revert to the undistributed
ssets of the insurer. Delay in final payment under this
iibsection is not a reason for unreasonable delay of final
istribution and discharge of the liquidator.
(5) If several claims founded upon one policy are filed,
r
hether by third parties or as claims by the insured under this
action, and the aggregate allowed amount of the claims to
hich the same limit of liability in the policy is applicable
tceeds that limit, each claim as allowed shall be reduced in
le same proportion so that the total equals the policy limit,
laims by the insured are evaluated as in Subsection (4). If
ay insured's claim is subsequently reduced under Subsection
I), the amount thus freed shall be apportioned ratably among
le claims which have been reduced under this subsection.
1985

LA-27-332. Disputed claims.
(1) (a) When a claim is disallowed m whole or in part by the
liquidator, written notice of the determination and of the
right to object shall be given promptly to the claimant or
the claimant's attorney of record, if any, by first-class mail
, at the addresses shown in the proof of claim.
(b) (i) Within 60 days from the mailing of the notice
required by Subsection (l)(a), the claimant may file
objections with the court.
(ii) If objections are not filed within the period
*,
provided in Subsection (l)(b)(i), the claimant may not
further object to the determination.
(2) (a) Whenever objections are filed with the court and the
liquidator does not alter the liquidator's ruling, the liquidator shall ask the court for a hearing as soon as practicable.
(b) If the liquidator asks for a hearing under Subsection (2)(a), the court shall issue an order setting a date as
early as possible.
(c) At the request of the liquidator, the court may
establish procedures for the objections hearing.
(d) The liquidator shall give notice of a hearing under
this Subsection (2) by first-class mail to:
(i) the claimant or the claimant's attorney; and
u
(ii) any other persons directly affected,
fe) A hearing under this Subsection (2):
(i) shall be heard without a jury; and
(ii) may be heard by:
(A) the court; or
(B) a court-appointed referee.

31A-27-335

(f) A hearing under this Subsection (2) shall be limited
to the evidence upon which the liquidator made the
determination of the claims.
(g) If a referee is appointed under this Subsection (2),
the referee shall submit to the court:
(i) findings of fact; and
(ii) recommendations,
(h) Consistent with Subsection 31A-27-336(2), the
court may approve, disapprove, or modify:
(i) the liquidator's determination of a claim; or
(ii) a referee's recommendations on a claim.
(3) A court order issued after a hearing and pursuant to this
section may be appealed as a final order for purposes of Rule
54, U t a h Rules of Civil Procedure.
2002

31A-27-333. Surety's claims against insurer.
Whenever a creditor whose claim against an insurer is
secured in whole or in part by the undertaking of another
person fails to prove and file t h a t claim, the other person may
do so in the creditor's name. The other person is subrogated to
the rights of the creditor, whether the claim has been filed by
the creditor or by the other person in the creditor's name, to
the extent that the other person discharges the undertaking.
In the absence of an agreement with the creditor to the
contrary, the other person is not entitled to any distribution
until the amount paid to the creditor on the undertaking plus
the distributions paid on the claim from the insurer's estate to
the creditor equals the amount of the entire claim of the
creditor. Any excess received by the creditor shall be held in
trust for the other person. As used in this section, "another
person" or "other person" does not apply to a guaranty fund or
association.
1986

31A-27-334. Secured claims.
(1) An allowed claim of a creditor that is secured by a lien
on property in which the insurer who is subject to a liquidation
has an interest, or that is subject to setoff under Section
31A-27-323, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of the
creditor's interest in the insurer's interest in the property or to
the extent of the amount subject to setoff.
(2) The value of any security for a claim is determined
under the supervision and control of the court:
(a) by converting it into money according to the terms
of the agreement under which the security was granted to
or retained by the creditor; or
(b) by agreement, arbitration, compromise, or litigation
between the creditor and the liquidator.
(3) The net amount received under Subsection (2)(a) or the
amount determined under Subsection (2Kb) shall be credited
upon the secured claim, and any deficiency shall be allowed as
an unsecured claim. If the claimant surrenders the security to
t h e liquidator, the entire claim shall be allowed as if unsecured.
1986
31A-27-335.

Priority of d i s t r i b u t i o n .

(1) (a) Every claim in each class of claims from the insurer's estate shall be paid in full or adequate funds retained
for the payment before the members of the next class
receive any payment
(b) Once the funds are retained by the liquidator and
approved by the court, the insurer's estate shall have no
further liability to members of that class except to the
extent of the retained funds and any other undistributed
funds.
(c) Subclasses may not be established within any class.
(d) A claim by a shareholder, policyholder, or other
creditor may not be permitted to circumvent the priority
classes through the use of equitable remedies.
(2) The classes and order of distribution are as described in
Subsections (2)(a) through (i).

31A-27-335
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(a) Class one is the costs and expenses of administration expressly approved by the liquidator, including:
(i) the actual and necessary costs of preserving or
recovering the assets of the insurer;
(ii) compensation for all authorized services rendered in the supervision, rehabilitation, or liquidation;
(iii) any necessary filing fees;
(iv) the fees and mileage payable to witnesses; and
(v) reasonable attorney's fees and other professional services rendered in the supervision, rehabilitation, or liquidation.
(b) (i) Class two is the administrative expenses of
guaranty associations.
(ii) For purposes of this section, 'administrative
expenses of a guaranty association" means the reasonable expenses incurred by a guaranty association:
(A) when the expenses are not payments or
expenses that are required to be incurred as
direct policy benefits in fulfillment of the terms of
the insurance contract or policy; and
(B) that are of the type and nature that, but
for the activities of the guaranty association,
otherwise would have been incurred by the liquidator, including:
(I) evaluations of policy coverage;
(II) activities involved in the adjustment
and settlement of claims under policies, including those of in-house or outside adjusters; and
(III) the reasonable expenses incurred in
connection with the arrangements for ongoing coverage through transfer to other insurers, policy exchanges, or maintaining policies in force.
(iii) The liquidator may in the liquidator's sole
discretion approve as an administrative expense of a
guaranty association any other reasonable expenses
of the guaranty association if the liquidator finds:
(A) the expenses are not expenses required to
be paid or incurred as direct policy benefits by
the terms of the policy; and
(B) the expenses were incurred in furtherance
of activities that provided material economic
benefit to the estate as a whole irrespective of
whether the activities resulted in additional benefits to covered claimants.
(iv) The court shall approve the expenses approved
by the liquidator under Subsection (2)(b)(iii) unless
the court finds the liquidator abused the liquidator's
discretion in approving the expenses
(c) (i) Class three is all claims under policies for losses
incurred including:
(A) claims of the federal, state, or local government;
(B) third party claims;
(C) claims for unearned premiums; and
(D) claims of a guaranty association, other
than those included in class two, including
claims for payment of covered claims or covered
obligations of the insurer
(ii) All claims under life and health insurance and
annuity policies shall be treated as loss claims.
(iii) That portion of any loss for which indemnification is provided by other benefits or advantages
recovered or recoverable by the claimant are not
included in this class, other than benefits or advantages recovered or recoverable in discharge of familial
obligations of support, by way of succession at death,
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as proceeds of life insurance, or as gratuities. /
payment made by an employer to the employer^
employee may not be treated as a gratuity.
(iv) Notwithstanding Subsections (2)(c)(i), (ii), an(
(iii), the following claims shall be excluded from clasj
three priority:
(A) obligations of the insolvent insurer arising
out of reinsurance contracts;
(B) obligations incurred after:
(I) the expiration date of the insurant
policy;
(II) the policy has been replaced by th<
insured;
(III) the policy has been canceled at th<
insured's request; or
(IV) the policy has been canceled as pro
vided in the chapter;
(C) obligations to insurers, insurance pools, oi
underwriting associations and their claims foi
contribution, indemnity, or subrogation, equita
ble or otherwise;
(D) any claim that is in excess of any applica
ble limits provided in the insurance policy issuet
by the insolvent insurer;
(E) any amount accrued as punitive or exem
plary damages unless expressly covered unde
the terms of the policy; and
(F) tort claims of any kind against the insurei
and claims against the insurer for bad faith o
wrongful settlement practices.
(v) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(c)(iv)(B), un
earned premium claims on policies, other than rein
surance agreements, may not be excluded.
(d) Class four is claims of the federal government othe
than those claims included under class three.
(e) (i) Class five is debts due employees for services
benefits, contractual or otherwise due, arising outc
reasonable compensation to employees for service
performed:
(A) to the extent that they:
(I) do not exceed two months of monetar
compensation; and
(II) represent payment for services pei
formed within six months before thefilingc
the petition for liquidation; or
(B) if rehabilitation preceded liquidatioi
within one year before the filing of the petitio
for rehabilitation.
(ii) Principal officers and directors are not entitle
to the benefit of class five priority except as otherwis
approved by the liquidator and the court.
(iii) Class five priority shall be in lieu of any oth^
similar priority that may be authorized by law as 1
wages or compensation of employees.
(f) (i) Class six is claims of:
(A) any person, including claims of state (
local governments, except those specifically cla
sified elsewhere in this section, or
(B) attorneys for fees and expenses owed thei
by a person for services rendered in opposing)
formal delinquency proceeding.
(ii) To prove the claim for attorneys' fees at
expenses, the claimant shall show that*
(A) the insurer that is the subject of the deli
quency proceeding incurred the fees and e
penses based on its best knowledge, informatio
and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry inC
eating opposition was(I) in the best interests of the person;
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(II) well grounded in fact, and
(III) warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
(B) opposition was not pursued for any improper purpose, such as to*
(I) harass;
(II) cause unnecessary delay; or
(III) cause needless increase in the cost of
litigation.
(g) (i) Class seven is claims of any state or local government for a penalty or forfeiture, but only to the
extent of the pecuniary loss sustained from the act,
transaction, or proceeding out of which the penalty or
forfeiture arose, including the reasonable and actual
costs incurred from the act, transaction, or proceeding.
(ii) The remainder of the claims shall be postponed
to class eight claims,
(h) Class eight is:
(i) surplus or contribution notes or similar obligations;
(ii) premium refunds on assessable policies;
(iii) interest on claims of classes one through
seven; and
(iv) any other claims specifically subordinated to
this class,
(i) Class nine is claims of shareholders or other owners,
including policyholders of a mutual insurance corporation
within the limits of Subsection 31A-27-337(4)(b) except as
they may be qualified in class three or four.
(3) (a) If the liquidator determines that the assets of the
estate will be sufficient to pay all class one claims in full,
class two claims shall be paid currently, only after the
liquidator secures from each of the guaranty associations
receiving disbursements under this section an agreement
to return to the liquidator the disbursements, together
v with investment income actually earned on the disbursements, as may be required to pay class one claims.
(b) A guaranty association entering into an agreement
under Subsection (3)(a) may not be required to post a
, bond.
^4) As to a nonprofit corporation organized and operating
under Chapter 7 with assets not fully liquidated under Subsections (1) and (2), the remaining assets shall be distributed
fitter Subsections 16-6a-1405(l)(b) and (c) and Subsection
16-6a-1405(2).
voji (a) If any claimant of this state, another state, or
foreign country is entitled to or receives a distribution
upon the claimant's claim out of a statutory deposit or the
proceeds of any bond or other asset located in another
sh l? £ r ^ o r e ^ c o u n try, unless the deposit or proceeds
t h i - e b e e n d e l i v e r e d t o t n e domiciliary liquidator,
/ e ^ i m a n t is not entitled to any further distribution
lic uidator
the*
*
until and unless all other claimants of
act S a m e c * a s s ' Respective of residence or place of the
j j * or contracts upon which their claims are based, shall
(h) r Al e i v e d a n e < l u a l distribution upon their claims.
\Q) After the equalization under Subsection (5)(a), the
t^fatfE*1^t roifbtuhtei osnas m e tchl a s s a r e entitled to share in the
LaD oft 6r e
°y e liquidator, along with and like
anfo . ?" dftors °f the same class, wherever the claim«u«s reside.
^UppivtK16 d e c l a r a t i ° n of a distribution, the liquidator
^ s owed fam0Unt ° f t h e d l s t r i b u t l o n against any mdebtl&ution Ti? t h e l n s u r e r by the person entitled to the

llNrged b
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"

wWfiinn+^ a ^ U a r a n t y association or entity performing a
uuc
r

tlon.
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(7) This section applies retrospectively to any proceeding
under this chapter initiated after January 1, 1992
2000
31A-27-335.5. Health
maintenance
organization
claims.
In the liquidation of a health maintenance organization,
claims for uncovered expenditures have priority over the third
class of claims as provided for in Section 31A-27-335 All other
claims shall follow the priority of distribution outlined m
Section 31A-27-335
1995
31A-27-336. Liquidator's recommendations to t h e
court.
(1) The liquidator shall review all claims duly filed in the
liquidation and shall make any further investigation as he
considers necessary. He may compound, compromise, or in any
other manner negotiate the amount for which claims will be
recommended to the court, except where the liquidator is
required by law to accept claims as settled by another person,
including a guaranty fund or association. Unresolved disputes
shall be determined under Section 31A-27-332. As soon as
practicable, the liquidator shall present to the court the
reports of claims against the insurer with the liquidator's
recommendations. The liquidator shall notify claimants of
these recommendations. The report shall include the name
and address of each claimant, the particulars of the claim, and
the amount of the claim finally recommended, if any. If the
insurer has issued annuities or life insurance policies, the
liquidator shall report the persons to whom, according to the
records of the insurer, amounts are owed as cash surrender
values or other investment values and the amounts owed. If
the insurer has issued policies on the advance premium plan,
the liquidator shall report the persons to whom, according to
the records of the insurer, unearned premiums are owed and
the amounts that are owed.
(2) The court may approve, disapprove, or modify the report
on claims by the liquidator, except that the liquidator's agreements with other parties are final and binding on the court on
claims of any size which are settled by a payment of $1,500 or
less. No claim under a policy of insurance may be allowed for
an amount in excess of the applicable policy limits.
1985
31A-27-337. D i s t r i b u t i o n of a s s e t s .
(1) (a) Subject to any instructions the court may give, the
liquidator shall make distributions in a manner that will
assure the proper recognition of priorities and a reasonable balance between the expeditious completion of the
liquidation and the protection of unliquidated and undetermined claims, including third party claims.
(b) Distribution of assets in kind may be made at
valuations set by agreement between the liquidator and
the creditor and approved by the court in advance of the
distribution.
(2) (a) The liquidator shall make distributions to guaranty
funds and associations under Subsection (1) to satisfy
their claims under Chapter 28, Guaranty Associations, or
similar laws of other states, if the claims have been filed
pursuant to rules established under Subsections 31A-27328(1) and (4).
(b) The total distributions to guaranty funds and associations paid under this Subsection (2) may not exceed the
total of the claims properly made by the funds and
associations under Subsections 31A-27-328U) and (4).
(c) The liquidator shall pay distributions as frequently
as is practicable and in sums as large as possible without
sacrificing asset values by untimely disposition or inequitable allocation of available assets
(d) The liquidator may protect against inequitable allocations by making payments to funds and associations
subject to binding agreements by the funds or associa-

